In Groundswell Developments Africa (Pty) Ltd and Others v Brown (899/2024) [2025] ZASCA 170 (Groundswell), the Western Cape High Court (High Court) recently had to consider, inter alia, whether the matter at hand permitted such piercing of the corporate veil and the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) considered an application for leave to appeal the High Court judgment.

High Court judgment

Jean Pierre Nortje (Nortje), a natural person purporting to be an estate agent, and Catherine Judy Brown (Brown), a natural person, concluded an agreement of sale (AOS) in which Brown sold her property to a company, Groundswell Developments Africa Proprietary Limited (Groundswell Developments). Pursuant to the conclusion of the AOS, Groundswell Developments concluded, without Brown’s knowledge, a renovations and repairs agreement (R&R Agreement) with a company, Horizon Group Proprietary Limited (Horizon), to perform extensive renovations to Brown’s property.

In terms of the R&R Agreement, Horizon was granted possession of the property and clause 12.5 of the agreement established a builder’s lien in favour of Horizon as well as a right to retain possession of the property until such time as all contract costs, which were in the amount of R3,5 million, were fully paid to Horizon. Nortje subsequently began residing in the property and using it as his office. When Brown discovered these hidden arrangements, she approached the High Court to set aside the AOS and to defeat Horizon’s builder’s lien.

Notably, the AOS (i) gave possession of the property to Groundswell Developments but did not make mention of any improvements; and (ii) noted the purchase price of the property at R3 million, being less than the amount of the improvements contemplated in the R&R Agreement.

It became apparent that Nortje (i) was not in possession of a valid fidelity fund certificate at the time of conclusion of the AOS; (ii) delivered an AOS that was materially different to two other offers received for the property; and (iii) did not act in the best interests of Brown by going to great lengths to elaborate fictitious schemes to advance his own interests, to the prejudice of Brown. It was further established that Nortje is the sole director and shareholder of Horizon. Prior to this, he was the sole director and shareholder of Groundswell Developments until he transferred his shares and appointed a Ms du Plessis as a director. Nortje subsequently resigned as the director of Groundswell Developments.

The High Court found that Nortje had committed various acts of misrepresentation, had failed to disclose his conflict of interest when acting as Brown’s estate agent and had abused the separate legal personality of Horizon. Importantly, the court held that Horizon was a façade for Nortje’s personal dealings and it disregarded Horizon’s separate legal personality, deemed Nortje and Horizon to be the same person (applying section 20(9) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (Companies Act)) and found the AOS to be invalid and of no force and effect.

Section 20(9) of the Companies Act provides, inter alia, that if a court finds that any act by or on behalf of a company constitutes an unconscionable abuse of the juristic personality of the company as a separate entity, the court may declare that the company be deemed not to be a juristic person in respect of any right, obligation or liability of the company or of a shareholder of the company.

Takeaway

Groundswell Developments, Nortje and Horizon sought leave to appeal and when such leave was refused by the High Court, they approached the SCA to reconsider such order under section 17(2)(f) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013. The SCA, in dismissing their application for reconsideration, affirmed the correctness of the findings of the High Court in terms of the unconscionable abuse of separate legal personality.

In a separate appeal, the SCA upheld the punitive costs order and confirmed that Nortje’s conduct amounted to an unconscionable abuse and that Brown had been a victim of Nortje’s “egregious scheme”.

Groundswell is a practical affirmation that section 20(9) of the Companies Act equips courts to protect the integrity of company law. By departing from the notion of separate legal personality and piercing the corporate veil in circumstances where the corporate form is misused, courts reinforce, rather than undermine, the principle of separate legal personality. The veil remains in place for honest business and is only lifted or pierced when worn as a disguise.