EACCA merger reviews: Suspensory process and timelines

The EACCA operates a suspensory regime, with the merger review process expected to take up to 120 business days from filing, after which approval is deemed by lapse of time. The staged process comprises of acknowledgement within three days; verification of completeness and payment within 10 days, culminating in a notice of complete filing; a 14‑day preliminary analysis to confirm cross‑border effect and thresholds; and publication of a public notice within 14 days of confirmation for stakeholder comments. A substantive competition and public-interest assessment then follows, with the review period extendable where standard remedies are required, whether structural (such as divestiture of a product line) or behavioural (a commitment about future conduct, such as continuing to supply certain customers), and where additional information is needed.

In carrying out its public interest test, the EACCA places significant weight on public-interest factors when reviewing mergers. Practically, this means parties should anticipate questions beyond market structure such as the deal’s impact on employment, the competitiveness of small and medium enterprises (SMEs), the development of nascent or strategic sectors, and whether the transaction strengthens a partner state’s ability to manage sector-wide crises. Transactions with potential job losses or reduced SME participation may face heightened scrutiny, and parties should be prepared to demonstrate positive spillovers or propose mitigating measures.

The EACCA’s substantial lessening competition test broadly mirrors the CCC’s two-step framework: defining the relevant market (using the Small but Significant and Non-transitory Increase in Prices Test) and evaluating whether the transaction is likely to substantially lessen competition. In practice, this involves a detailed review of market shares, potential dominance, barriers to entry, and theories of harm alongside any efficiencies and consumer benefits the parties can credibly substantiate. Importantly, even where competition concerns arise, the EACCA may still authorise a merger in exceptional cases where the transaction demonstrably enhances a partner state’s capacity to respond to a sector crisis. Parties should therefore prepare robust economic data, market evidence and clear efficiency justifications to support a smooth review.

Notably, parties may request that certain information be treated as confidential by submitting a confidentiality claims form at the time of filing the merger notification. The form requires parties to specify the nature of the information and its owner, demonstrate the economic value of the information (for example, trade secrets or commercially sensitive industrial data), outline any existing restrictions on access (such as information protected by privilege or national official-secrets laws), and provide a clear justification for the confidentiality request. 

Following its review, the EACCA may approve, conditionally approve or block a merger. Under the previous regime, any appeal would have been directed to the Council of Ministers, an impractical mechanism given the irregularity of council meetings. In contrast, parties will now have a more accessible avenue for recourse before the East African Court of Justice. Although the 2025 EAC Competition (Mergers and Acquisitions) Regulations do not prescribe a statutory deadline for lodging appeals, parties may pursue matters before the court’s first instance division, with the option to escalate to the appellate division and, where warranted, seek a judgment review. While the structured timeline offers certainty, parties should plan for potential timing sensitivities where financing or execution is clearance‑dependent.

Interaction with domestic law

From the EACCA’s perspective, regional treaties take precedence over conflicting domestic laws. While the Constitution of Kenya, 2010 already incorporates ratified treaties as part of domestic law, the Competition Authority of Kenya (CAK) may still require local merger filings until national legislation fully aligns with the EACCA framework. Parties should continue complying with CAK requirements, as non-compliance can attract fines of up to 10% of Kenyan annual turnover, or in some cases, imprisonment or fines of KES 10 million. Kenya is expected to amend its competition laws to formally integrate the EACCA regime, similar to prior COMESA adjustments.

In Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda, dual notification is less likely given more recent regimes that incorporate regional co-operation and alignment with the EACCA. Nevertheless, local confirmation of filing positions remains prudent. By contrast, dual notification with COMESA in transactions involving Kenyan entities will remain necessary for now. The EACCA does not anticipate significant overlap with the CCC because its jurisdictional thresholds are lower, so only larger multi‑jurisdictional transactions are likely to trigger concurrent filings. To mitigate conflicting outcomes, the EACCA has signed memoranda of understanding with the CAK, CCC and other regulators to co-ordinate merger reviews.

Stakeholder engagements with the EACCA indicate an emerging approach in that transactions involving two EAC partner states will fall under its jurisdiction, while those involving three or more COMESA member states will be handled by the CCC. The rollout will be phased, allowing for some transitional overlap.

Practical takeaways

EACCA filing fees are generally non‑refundable, except where the EACCA determines a transaction is outside its jurisdiction; in such cases, it may retain 30% and refund 70% of the fees. It is therefore advisable to seek a written advisory opinion and request for a pre‑notification meeting with the EACCA to clarify jurisdiction, procedural requirements, and timing expectations, thereby reducing uncertainty and mitigating filing risks. Early planning, alignment with national obligations, and careful sequencing of regional and domestic notifications will remain critical to managing costs, timelines, and enforcement exposure.