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Mondo Ntlha
Director
National Practice Head: Competition
+27 (0)11 290 7128
mondo.ntlha@dlacdh.com
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Petra Krusche
Director
Regional Practice Head: Competition
+27 (0)21 481 6350
petra.krusche@dlacdh.com

Competition/Antitrust

Merger Control

The parties to a merger which has an effect in South Africa and which exceeds certain combined asset and/or turnover thresholds established by the Competition Act may not implement the transaction without first obtaining the approval of the competition authorities.

8.6 Definition
8.6.1 A merger occurs when one or more firms directly or indirectly acquire or establish direct or indirect control over the whole or part of the business of another firm. The term "firm" includes a person, partnership or trust. The Competition Appeal Court has given the term "control" the widest possible meaning so as to allow the relevant competition authorities to examine a wide range of transactions which could result in an alteration of the market structure and in particular which may reduce the level of competition in the relevant market.
8.6.2 A merger may be achieved in any manner, including through:
8.6.2.1 purchase or lease of shares, an interest or assets of the other firm in question; or
8.6.2.2 amalgamation or other combination with that other firm.
8.6.3 Ultimately, any transaction that allows one or more firms to materially influence the policy of another firm, is likely to give rise to a merger.
8.6.4 In addition to assessing the effect of a merger on competition, the authorities take into account socio-economic factors such as the effect of the merger on employment, small businesses and historically disadvantaged persons. As a result it is not a pre-requisite to notification that a merger has an effect on competition. Employees and organised labour must be notified of the merger and may participate in the proceedings. Other interested parties (including competitors and customers) may also intervene in merger proceedings with the leave of the Tribunal.
8.7 Thresholds
8.7.1 The Competition Act establishes three categories of mergers which are determined with reference to the turnover or assets (whichever is the higher) of the acquiring firm and the target firm.
8.7.2 A small merger occurs where the combined assets or turnover of the acquiring firm and the target firm are below R560 million or the target firm's assets or turnover are below R80 million.
8.7.3 An intermediate merger occurs where the combined assets or turnover of the acquiring firm and the target firm equal or exceed R560 million and the target firm's assets or turnover equal or exceed R80 million.
8.7.4 A large merger occurs where the combined assets or turnover of the acquiring firm and the target firm equal or exceed R6,600 million and the target firm's assets or turnover equal or exceed R190 million.
8.7.5 For purposes of calculating the thresholds, the entire acquirer group is taken into account. In relation to the target the firm over which control is transferred, together with all firms controlled by such transferred firm, is taken into account.
8.8 Notification
8.8.1 The parties to a small merger may implement the merger without approval, but the Commission may call on the parties to notify the merger to the Commission at any time up to six months after the implementation date, if it believes that the merger may substantially prevent or lessen competition or cannot be justified on grounds of public interest. In such an event, the parties may take no further steps to implement the transaction pending approval. The parties to a small merger may notify voluntarily prior to implementation. The Commission has issued a guidance on small merger notification, it which it advises parties to a small merger to voluntarily inform the Commission of a purposed transaction, if such transaction meets any of the following criteria:
  • At the time of entering into the transaction, or firms within their group, are subject to an investigation by the Competition Commission, in terms of Chapter 2 of the Competition Act, which deals with Prohibited Practices; or
  • At the time of entering into the transaction, any of the firms or firms within the group, are respondents to pending proceedings, referred to the Competition Commission in terms of Chapter 2 of the Act.
If these criteria are met, parties are advised, when informing the Commission of the intended transaction, to provide information regarding the transaction, the parties and the markets in which the parties compete, Based on this information, the Commission will then inform parties to the proposed small merger, whether the Commission requires a formal merger notification, in respect of the transaction.
8.8.2 The parties to an intermediate or large merger may not implement the merger without the approval of the competition authorities. In the Gold Field / Harmony case, the Competition Appeal Court sought to distinguish between the completion of a merger and its implementation, and held that what the Competition Act seeks to prohibit is not the completion of a merger, but any implementation thereof prior to authorization having been granted by the relevant competition authorities. The judgment raises a number of practical difficulties and its implications have not yet been tested before the Tribunal.
8.8.3 The Competition Act and the Rules promulgated there under set out in detail the procedure for notifying the Commission of a merger. No time periods for notification are prescribed, save that the parties may not implement a notifiable merger without approval.
8.8.4 The Commission has a maximum of sixty business days to consider a small or intermediate merger. If it has not approved or prohibited the merger on expiry of that time period, the merger is deemed to have been approved.
8.8.5 The Commission has forty business days to consider and refer a large merger to the Tribunal. The Tribunal may, on application by the Commission, extend this period by no more than fifteen business days at a time.
8.8.6 Within ten business days of the referral of a large merger, the Tribunal must schedule a pre-hearing or hearing. This period may be extended on application to the chairperson of the Tribunal. Within ten business days of the hearing, the Tribunal must approve or prohibit the merger and within twenty business days thereafter must issue reasons for its decision.
8.9 Fees
No fee is payable to the Commission for the notification of a small merger. The fees for intermediate and large mergers are R100,000.00 and R350,000.00 respectively. These are administrative fees payable to the Commission and are over and above any legal fees that may be incurred if the assistance of an attorney is obtained in preparing a merger notification.
8.10 Evaluation
8.10.1 In evaluating a merger, the Commission first considers whether the merger is likely to substantially prevent or lessen competition. Factors considered by the Commission include:
8.10.1.1 the level of actual and potential import competition in the market;
8.10.1.2 the ease of entry into the market, including tariff and regulatory barriers;
8.10.1.3 the level and trends of concentration, and history of collusion, in the market;
8.10.1.4 the degree of countervailing power in the market;
8.10.1.5 the dynamic characteristics of the market, including growth, innovation, and product differentiation;
8.10.1.6 the nature and extent of vertical integration in the market;
8.10.1.7 whether the business or part of the business of a party to the merger or proposed merger has failed or is likely to fail; and
8.10.1.8 whether the merger will result in the removal of an effective competitor.
8.10.2 If the Commission finds that a merger is likely to have an anti-competitive effect, it may still find the merger to be justifiable on the basis of efficiency, technology or other pro-competitive gains that are shown to outweigh any anticompetitive effect..
8.10.3 In considering all mergers, including pro-competitive mergers, the Commission considers the effect the merger will have on the public interest, with specific reference to its effect on :
8.10.3.1 a particular industrial sector or region;
8.10.3.2 employment;
8.10.3.3 the ability of small and black business to become competitive; and
8.10.3.4 the ability of national industries to compete internationally.
8.10.4 A merger with no anticompetitive effect could be prohibited if, for instance, it will result in massive job losses.
8.10.5 Following an investigation by the Commission and, in the case of a large merger, a Tribunal hearing, the merger may be approved; approved subject to conditions, or prohibited.

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